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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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on behalf of Germany.   The findings of the graves in Katyn.   And once
again a severance of the diplomatic relations between Poland and Russia.
Stalin's declaration regarding a c strong, independent Poland' and her
future alliance with Russia. The accusations made against the entire Polish
Embassy in Russia of espionage for Germany., etc., etc.
(Nowakowski, Z. "Montagnes Russes." Wiadomosd Pol$kie3 Polish
News, London, 1943)."
The results of the first phase of the Soviet's new foreign policy, after
the Germans had invaded their country, were to prove exceptionally
favourable to Russia. Old grievances were forgotten and old scores
wiped out. Enormous quantities of supplies were hastily sent from
Britain and the U.S., and the future of inter-Allied relations was placed
with every confidence into the hands of Russia as Great Britain carefully
piloted her into the circle of the United Nations.
The general aim of the Soviets with regard to Poland had already been
clearly presented by Molotov, in May, 1939 (see Vol. I, p. 129), when
Russia first demanded e bases * in her Eastern provinces. The Poles had
refused, but later, however, through the agreement with Germany and
subsequent invasion, the Kremlin was able to attain its goal. After
the German attack on Russia and when it became obvious that it would
be difficult to dominate Poland, Moscow tried to drag the Polish Govern-
ment in London within the sphere of Russian political influence, and to
remodel it into a puppet government, or, as they were soon to term it,
into a cfriendly9 government.
After the signing of the July Treaty of 1941, the Soviets immediately
adopted an attacking position. Following Russian tradition and custom,
they began to put their demands to Poland and, that country, who as a
victim of their aggression should have received indemnities, soon found
herself forced to protect her possessions against these unprecedented
claims of the Soviets. The situation was further complicated by the
fact that, just then, Russia was holding over a million Poles as hostages,
the man-power upon whom the Polish Government was relying for a
further active participation in the war. How, and to what extent, this
stock of people was to be employed in the fight for the Allied cause,
depended therefore upon the Soviets. To neutral observers in New York
and London, it seemed that a full concord between the two Powers would
have been the natural sequence, but as events were soon to show, the
Soviets, with great foresight, taking a long-term view, beyond the war,
were correctly appraising the fact that unless Poland could be tamed here
and now, unless she were degraded to a condition of vassalhood and used
as an instrument of Russian policy, then the temporary war-time benefit
which she (Russia) might gain from the creation of a large Polish Army
on her soil, would have no great value in comparison with the outcome ef
the existence of such a body. Its presence at the end of hostilities would
be incompatible with Russia's post-war imperialist aims, therefore, this
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